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ABSTRACT
The absence of a competitive market may enable public-sector workers to extract rents from taxpayers
in the form of high pay, especially when public-sector workers are unionized. On the other hand, this
rent extraction may be suppressed by the ability of taxpayers to vote with their feet, leaving jurisdictions
where public-sector workers extract high rents. However, although migration of taxpayers may limit
rent-seeking, public-sector workers may be able to extract higher rents in regions where high amenities
mute the migration response. We develop a theoretical model that predicts such a link between public-sector
wage differentials and local amenities, and we test the model’s predictions by analyzing variation in
these wage differentials and amenities across states. We find that public-sector wage differentials are,
in fact, larger in the presence of high amenities, with the effect stronger for unionized public-sector
workers who are likely better able to exercise political power in extracting rents. The implication is
that the mobility of taxpayers is insufficient to prevent rent-seeking behavior of public-sector workers
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1. Introduction
Public-sector pay is not set in competitive markets. Public-sector unionization is high
(Visser, 2006), and public-sector unions are strong and active politically (DiSalvo, 2010). As
a consequence, the pay of public-sector workers is likely to reﬂect, in part, the extraction of
rents from taxpayers. Indeed, the potential for public-sector workers to inﬂuence pay (and
employment) has long been noted by labor economists (Freeman, 1986).
The issue of public-sector pay has come to the fore lately, in part because of state budget
woes. The media and blogosphere are replete with stories about overpaid public-sector workers,
from prison guards in California,1 to teachers and other public-sector workers in New Jersey,2
to unionized public-sector workers generally.3 Not surprisingly, the reality is more complex.
Looking at the public sector in the aggregate reveals that, in recent years, public-sector workers
are not overpaid. Although for both men and women, data from 2000 reveal a positive pay gap
between the public and private sectors (about 11 percent for men and 20 percent for women),
in earnings regressions with the usual controls, there is a negative pay diﬀerential for working
in the public sector of 6 percent for men, and no pay diﬀerential for women (Borjas, 2002).4
On the other hand, researchers have pointed to pensions and other beneﬁts for public-sector
workers that are very generous, particularly when account is taken of underfunded pension
liabilities and how they are calculated (Biggs, 2010a, 2010b; DiSalvo, 2010). In addition, the
power of public-sector unions, as exempliﬁed by the extensive union involvement in eﬀorts
to recall governors in California (Malanga, 2010), suggests that substantial scope for rent
extraction may exist.5
Freeman (1986), however, argued against the ability of public-sector unions to extract high
rents, using a Tiebout-sorting view of the world: “Citizens unhappy with [the] level of public
1services can move elsewhere, reducing the taxable population and thus the ability to pay public
sector wages. Mobility places great constraints on public-sector union bargaining power” (p.
51). But this view need not rule out speciﬁc cases where public-sector workers are overpaid.
Indeed, casual inference based on the stories cited above suggests that high public-sector pay
may be a phenomenon conﬁned to particular states—speciﬁcally those states well endowed
with the amenities often emphasized by urban economists. Facing a high willingness-to-pay on
the part of potential residents to live in a high-amenity state, public-sector workers may have
more leeway for rent extraction, leading to a link between public-sector wages and amenities.
The purpose of the present paper is to test for such a link.
Initial suggestive evidence for this wage-amenity connection is contained in Figure 1, which
plots state-level public-sector wage residuals (representing the wage component not explained
by the usual controls) against state-level private-sector wage residuals.6 The solid line has slope
equal to one, so that points on the line represent a state in which the public-sector and private-
sector wage premia for the state are equal. While most of points are in fact below the line, note
the identities of the states above the line—states where the public-sector premium is larger
than the private-sector premium and hence where public-sector workers are “overpaid.” These
states have warm weather (California and Florida), low rainfall (Nevada), a coastal location
(e.g., New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island), and large, dense urban areas (New York,
New Jersey, and California). Thus, Figure 1 suggests that rent extraction may be occurring
in places where people like to live.
We develop and test a model that explores this hypothesis. Building on existing work on
the public sector (e.g., O’Brien, 1992; Rose and Sonstelie, 2010; Zax and Ichniowski, 1988),
we presume that public-sector workers—especially unionized ones—have some ability to de-
termine their pay (and perhaps also their levels of employment) through the political process.
Consistent with Freeman’s argument, we would expect that this political power would face
limitations, because if public-sector workers extract rents (and thus taxes) that are too high
relative to the level of desired publicly-produced goods and services, then taxpayers will vote
with their feet, depriving public-sector workers of the tax base from which to extract rents.7
However, in locations with strong amenities, public-sector workers may have more ability to
2extract rents, as these amenities drive wedges between the utility of taxpayers in diﬀerent
locations that public-sector workers can exploit.
Our stylized theoretical model takes an extreme viewpoint by assuming that the public
sector is fully controlled by its workers, who have the power to set the public-good level as
well as taxes, which cover both the nonlabor cost of the good as well as their own high wages.
These workers set taxes along with the level of the public good to maximize the public-sector
wage (and thus their utility), taking the induced migration between regions into account. The
key results of the model connect the wage levels of both public- and private-sector workers to
the level of a region’s amenities. As captured in Figure 1, the main empirical hypothesis is
that amenities raise the public-sector wage relative to the private-sector wage, a consequence
of the improved rent-extraction potential in a high-amenity region. The model also predicts
that public-sector wages should be higher in an absolute sense in high-amenity regions.
Our model is related to the large literature on tax competition, in which local governments
make ﬁscal decisions taking into account the footloose nature of business investment, which
is deterred by high local taxes. Here, though, the focus is on mobile private-sector workers
rather than mobile business capital. Within this literature, which is surveyedby Wilson (1999),
the paper is most closely connected to models of tax competition by rent-seeking rather than
benevolent local governments, as exempliﬁedby Edwards and Keen(1996). Our framework also
shares elements of models in the Roback (1982) tradition, which show how amenity diﬀerences
aﬀect interregional patterns of wages and house prices.
The model’s predictions are tested using Current Population Survey data. We estimate
standard log wage regressions that include a public-sector wage diﬀerential, a wage diﬀerential
associated with local amenities, and an interaction between these two diﬀerentials. The in-
teraction coeﬃcient reveals that the public-sector wage diﬀerential is larger in the presence of
strong amenities, as predicted by the theory. The results are remarkably robust. They emerge
for public-sector workers overall, and for two large groups of public-sector workers that are
the focus of much attention with regard to pay: teachers and prison guards (or correctional
oﬃcers). Moreover, the evidence is particularly strong for unionized public-sector workers, who
are presumably better able to exercise political power to extract rents.
3The paper’s empirical work bears a close resemblance to empirical studies in the Roback
tradition. A common approach to implementing the Roback (1982) model, as exempliﬁed
by Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988), is to estimate two regressions relating individual
wages and house prices to regional amenity levels.8 The results of these regressions are then
merged to generate estimates of consumer amenity valuations, building on the theory. Our key
regression is similar to a Roback-style wage regression, except that it includes, along with the
usual amenity measures, terms that interact the amenity levels with a public-worker dummy
variable. The coeﬃcientsof the (uninteracted) amenitylevelsgive the usual impact of amenities
on private-sector wages, while the interaction coeﬃcients give the diﬀerential amenity eﬀect on
public-sector wages, which the theory predicts is positive. Moreover, if unionized workers have
more ability to extract rents, then their amenity interaction coeﬃcient should be larger than
the coeﬃcient for public-sector workers as a whole. The empirical results strongly conform
to all these expectations. In addition, they conﬁrm the prediction that amenities raise the
absolute level of public-sector wages.
Section 2 of the paper develops the theoretical model, while section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 presents the empirical work, and section 5 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Model
2.1. Basic analysis
The economy has two regions, with region 1 having a positive amenity level and region
2 a zero level (a normalization). Region 1’s amenity could have a consumption component
(denoted a) as well as a component that raises worker productivity (denoted b). There are
two groups of residents in each region: private-sector workers, who are mobile across regions,
and public-sector workers, who are immobile.9 This latter group has captured control of the
public sector in each region, and thus has the ability to set the public-good level as well as
taxes.10 Taxes pay for the cost of the public good while also covering rent extraction by the
public-sector workers, in the form of excessive wages. For simplicity, public-sector workers do
not consume the good they produce, so that only private workers consume the public good
and pay taxes. As seen below, relaxation of this assumption has no eﬀect on the results. In
4setting the level of the good as well as taxes, public workers play a Nash game across regions,
taking account of the fact that their decisions aﬀect the location choices of private workers.
For simplicity, the model is initially developed without consumption of housing, which plays a
key role in the usual Roback-style framework. Once the basic conclusions are derived, housing
is introduced with little eﬀect on the results.
Let zi denote the public-good level in region i, and suppose that the good is a publicly
produced private good with cost per unit normalized to unity. Per capita cost is then just zi,
being independent of the size of the private-worker population. This cost represents only the
cost of nonlabor inputs, not including the wages of public-sector workers, which are a separate
expense covered by rent extraction. Note that, with the size of the public work force ﬁxed in
each region, an increase in zi is achieved solely by raising non-labor inputs, whose costs are
assumed to rise in proportion to zi.
Let xi denote consumption of the private good and ai denote the consumption amenity
level in region i. We assume that the preferences of private workers are quasi-linear and given
by
xi + ai + v(zi). (1)
In (1), suitable measurement allows to the amenity to enter utility in linear fashion, just like
xi.11 Since public-sector workers do not consume the public good (an assumption relaxed
below), their utility is instead equal to the amenity plus x consumption.
Let Li denote the number of private-sector workers in region i. The economy’s total
number of private workers is ﬁxed at L, so that L1+L2 = L. Letting bi denote the level of the
production amenity in region i, private-sector output in the region is given by f(Li)+biLi, with
the wage equal to f0(Li)+bi (f00 < 0 holds). The production amenity thus aﬀects productivity
in an additive fashion.12 Proﬁt from private production is assumed to ﬂow to agents outside
the economy.
Let Ri denote public-sector rent extraction per private-sector worker. Since taxes per
private-sector worker are then equal to zi + Ri, the private-sector worker’s budget constraint
5is xi + zi + Ri = f0(Li) + bi. Utility for a region-1 worker is then
f0(L1) + b1 − z1 − R1 + a1 + v(z1). (2)
Since the amenity components enter additively in (2), they can be collapsed into a single term,
denoted A, with b1 = αA and a1 = (1 − α)A, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. A pure consumption amenity
corresponds to α = 0, while a pure production amenity corresponds to α = 1.13 A “composite”
amenity has an intermediate value of α. Although most of the analysis is unaﬀected by the
nature of the amenity, region 1’s private-sector wage, which equals f0(L1) + αA, depends on
its source.
Migration between the regions must equate utilities. Recalling that no amenity is present
in region 2, the equilibrium condition
f0(L1) − z1 − R1 + A + v(z1) = f0(L − L1) − z2 − R2 + v(z2) (3)
must hold. Note that, in the presence of housing, cost-of-living diﬀerences between regions
would enter (3), as seen in the extension below. Condition (3) determines L1 and thus the
division of population as a function of the decision variables z1, R1, z2, and R2, as well as A.
Holding the decisions variables constant, an increase in A will shift workers toward region 1,
with L1 rising. Although an increase in region 1’s amenity thus entices workers to live there,
holding the z’s and the R’s ﬁxed, our interest lies in exploring how a stronger pull of the
amenity, as reﬂected in a larger A, aﬀects the levels of these decision variables, as chosen by
rent-seeking public-sector workers.
Recognizing the dependence of L1 on the decision variables, public workers in region i
choose zi and Ri to maximize their income, taking the other region’s choices as given in Nash
fashion. To characterize the solution to this problem, consider region 1’s decisions and note











f00(L1) + f00(L − L1)
< 0. (5)
6Greater rent extraction in region 1 naturally reduces its population, while the eﬀect of z1
depends on the sign of the numerator in (4), which determines whether the good is over or
underprovided relative to the eﬃcient level (an increase in z1 raises L1 when the good is
underprovided, with v0 > 1).
Total rent extraction by public workers in region 1 equals L1R1. With the number of
such workers ﬁxed at M in each region, rent per public-sector worker (which corresponds
to the public-sector wage) equals L1R1/M. Thus, maximizing the public-sector wage means
maximizing L1R1 by proper choice of z1 and R1, viewing z2 and R2 as ﬁxed. The ﬁrst-order








f00(L1) + f00(L − L1)
= 0, (6)
using (4). This condition reduces to v0(z1) = 1, which implies that the public-good is chosen
eﬃciently (with marginal beneﬁt equal to the unitary marginal cost). With the public-good
level set in socially optimal fashion, private-sector workers are encouraged to live in region
1, allowing more rent to be extracted by public-sector workers. Let z∗ denote the optimal
public-good level, which is independent of the level of amenities (an outcome that follows from
quasi-linear utility).
The ﬁrst order condition for R1 is
∂L1R1
∂R1





f00(L1) + f00(L − L1)
= 0, (7)
using (5).15 Rearranging (7) allows R1 to be written in terms of L1:
R1 = −L1[f00(L1) + f00(L − L1)]. (8)
Public workers in region 2 maximize (L − L1)R2 by choosing z2 and R2, and analogous
solutions emerge. The public-good level satisﬁes v0(z2) = 1, thus equaling z∗, and R2 is given
by
R2 = −(L − L1)[f00(L1) + f00(L − L1)]. (9)
7The Nash-equilibrium level of L1 can be found by using (8) and (9) to eliminate R1 and
R2 in the migration condition (3). Making these substitutions yields
f0(L1)+L1[f00(L1)+f00(L−L1)] + A = f0(L−L1)+(L−L1)[f00(L1)+f00(L−L1)], (10)
where the terms involving z∗ cancel. This equation determines L1 as a function of A.
2.2. The eﬀect of amenities on public- and private-sector wages
Using (10), the main questions of interest can be addressed: how do amenities aﬀect public-
and private-sector wages? The ﬁrst step is diﬀerentiate (10), which yields
∂L1
∂A
= −{3f00(L1) + 3f00(L − L1) + (2L1 − L)[f000(L1) − f000(L − L1)]}−1. (11)
Despite the apparent ambiguity of the sign of (11) (a consequence of the presence of f000), the
expression can be signed using a stability condition for the equilibrium. However, the subse-
quent discussion is simpler when it relies on a local analysis around the symmetric outcome
(where A = 0), in which case the sign of (11) is clear from inspection. With A = 0, L1 = L/2







Thus, region 1 (the high amenity region) has more private-sector workers than region 2. Note
that the derivative in (11) gives the change in L1 when a small amenity advantage is introduced
in region 1, starting from a situation where neither region has amenities.
The eﬀect of A on the private-sector wage is driven by a change in the marginal product
of labor as a result of migration. In the case of a pure consumption amenity, which does not
directly aﬀect the marginal product, the private-sector wage in region 1 falls as in-migration
depresses f0. But with a composite amenity, a direct productivity eﬀect interacts with the
migration eﬀect, making the change in the marginal product ambiguous and dependent on the














using (12). So while the private-sector wage falls with A in the case of a pure consumption
amenity, where α = 0, the wage rises with A in the case of a pure production amenity, where
α = 1 and (13) equals 5/6. With a composite amenity, the wage falls only if the consumption
component is large, with α < 1/6.
Since region 2 loses workers, the private-sector wage rises there regardless of the nature of
region 1’s amenity. The wage derivative is equal to f00∂L2/∂A = −f00∂L1/∂A = 1/6, using
(12).














{2L1[f00(L1) + f00(L − L1)] + L2





















Therefore, regardless of whether the amenity aﬀects consumption or production, total rent
extraction, and thus the public-sector wage, is higher in region 1 than in region 2. With a
9stronger amenity tending to pull private-sector workers toward region 1, public-sector workers
are thus able to extract more rent as A increases. Because L1 is large for any given R1 when
A is large, public-sector workers enjoy a bigger population base for rent extraction, allowing
them to better tolerate the population loss resulting from this behavior and thus to pursue it
more aggressively.
Note that when the amenity has a consumption component, the increase in A yields also
yields nonpecuniary amenity beneﬁts to region 1’s public-sector workers, compounding their
gain from a higher wage. Since public-sector workers are immobile, however, no migration
force works to oﬀset these beneﬁts (region 2’s public-sector workers cannot relocate).
A key ﬁnal question concerns how the public-sector wage gap between the high- and low-
amenity regions compares to the private-sector gap. Since the public-sector wage rises (falls) at
the same rate in region 1 (2) as A increases, the regional public-sector wage gap is proportional
to twice the relevant derivative from (16), or 2L/3M. Since the private-sector wage changes
at a rate equal to α − 1/6 in region 1 while rising at a rate of 1/6 in region 2, the regional
wage gap is proportional to (α−1/6) −1/6, or α−1/3, which can take either sign. Thus, the







When α is small, the right-hand side of (13) is negative, indicating that the private-sector
wage is lower in region 1 than in region 2, an outcome that makes the regional gap negative
and thus lower than the positive public-sector wage gap. But when α > 1/3, the private-sector
gap is positive, making the relationship between the public and private gaps not immediately
clear. But since the right-hand side of (18) is less than 1, the inequality will be satisﬁed when
2L/3M > 1 or when L > (3/2)M = (3/4)(2M). The latter inequality states that the total
private work force in both regions (L) is larger than 3/4 of the total public work force, which
equals 2M.16 Since the private work force is in reality much larger than the public work force,
this condition is realistic, and the regional public-sector wage gap exceeds the private-sector
gap. This conclusion and (16) yield the main empirical hypotheses generated by the model:
10Proposition 1. Under the maintained assumptions, amenities raise the absolute level
of public-sector wages while also raising these wages relative to private-sector wages.
In other words, the public-sector wage gap between the high- and low-amenity regions is
always positive, and it exceeds the private-sector wage gap, which can be either positive
or negative depending on the nature of the amenity.
In the case of a pure consumption amenity, the diﬀerential eﬀect of the amenity on public-
and private-sector wages is transparent. The in-migration generated by an increase in the
amenity depresses labor’s marginal product and thus the private-sector wage, while the pop-
ulation gain is exploited by public-sector workers to raise total rent extraction and thus their
individual wage. With a pure production amenity, the rise in the private-sector wage com-
pounds the beneﬁt from in-migration, expanding the scope of possible rent extraction and
leading to a public-sector wage increase that exceeds the private increase.
Note that this latter outcome would be reversed if the public work force were much larger
than the private-sector work force, so that (18) is not satisﬁed. With results of rent extraction
needing to be shared across many public-sector workers, the increase in the individual wage
would then be smaller, making the public-sector wage gap between high and low-amenity
regions less than the private-sector gap.
2.3. Adding housing consumption
The previous results are mostly unaﬀected under several modiﬁcations of the model. First,
the assumption that public-sector workers do not consume the public good can be relaxed
without aﬀecting any of the previous results. The appendix demonstrates this conclusion by
allowing the public good to enter the utility functions of both types of workers while requiring
public-sector workers to pay taxes.
The analysis so far suppresses housing consumption and housing prices, which play a
key role in Roback-style models. However, these elements can also be added to the current
framework without substantially aﬀecting any of the previous results, provided the addition
is done in a certain way. Speciﬁcally, private-sector workers are assumed to consume land
(interpreted as housing), while public workers are not consumers of land and ﬁrms do not
require a land input, using only labor. Making the latter two groups of agents land-users
would require major changes to the model, with uncertain eﬀects on the results.
11Let q1 and q2 denote individual land consumption by private workers in the two regions,
and let the (additively separable) utility from housing consumption be s(qi). Letting p1 denote
the land price in region 1, the utility expression on the left-hand side of (3) is then augmented
by the terms s(q1) − p1q1. Since the ﬁrst-order condition for choice of q1 is s0(q1) = p1, these
new terms can be replaced by s(q1)−s0(q1)q1. The analogous expression s(q2)−s0(q2)q2 appears
on the right-hand side of (3).
With two new unknowns, q1 and q2, appearing in the model, additional equilibrium con-
ditions are needed, and these conditions come from market-clearing requirements. Letting
the residential land area in each region be ﬁxed and normalized to one, the market-clearing
conditions are L1q1 = 1 and L2q2 = 1. For region 1, q1 is then given by 1/L1, so that the new
terms on the left-hand side of (3) become
s(1/L1) − s0(1/L1)/L1 ≡ h(L1), (19)
where h0(L1) = s00(1/L1)L−3
1 < 0. Let g(L1) ≡ f0(L1)+h(L1), with g0(L1) = f00(L1)+h0(L1) <
0. Then, the equal-utility condition in (3) can be written as
g(L1) − z1 − R1 + A + v(z1) = g(L − L1) − z2 − R2 + v(z2) (20)
Since g(·) takes the place of f0(·), and since both functions are decreasing in L1, the analysis
leading to the key derivatives (11) and (12) is unaﬀected, with g0 replacing f00 in (12). In
addition, the impact of the amenity on public-sector rent is unaﬀected, with (16) and (17)
continuing to hold.
Although the calculation of A’s impact on the private-sector wage is altered, the previous
conclusion on the eﬀect of amenities on the wage gap is unchanged. With (12) using g0 instead
of f00, the wage derivative is
f00∂L1
∂A










12where λ = f00/g0 = f00/(f00 + h0) < 1 (the functions in this expression are evaluated at L/2).
Thus, the private-sector wage once again rises with the amenity level unless the consumption
component represents a large share of the total amenity eﬀect (with α < λ/6). The regional
public-sector wage gap is again larger than the private-sector wage gap (which equals α−λ/3),
assuming that the previous condition on worker populations is satisﬁed.17 Proposition 1 thus
continues to hold.
This modiﬁed model also generates predictions about land prices. Since ∂L1/∂A > 0 and
s00 < 0, it follows that region 1’s land price, given by p1 = s0(1/L1) is increasing in A, with
region 2’s price decreasing in A. Thus, regardless of the nature of the amenity, land prices are
higher in region 1 than in region 2. This prediction, as well as those above, might be modiﬁed
in model that incorporates land consumption in a diﬀerent fashion.18 The model can also
generate a connection between rent-seeking and land prices like that explored Gyourko and
Tracy (1989b,c), although the current focus is diﬀerent.19
A ﬁnal point that is useful in the empirical work involves the comparison between the
amenity’s private-sector wage impact with and without housing consumption. As seen above,
when housing consumption is absent, the regional wage gap is proportional to α −1/3. In the
presence of housing, the gap is α − λ/3, a larger quantity given λ < 1. The reason for this
relationship is that the increase in housing prices chokes oﬀ migration sooner in response to
an amenity gap, keeping wages farther apart.
A key implication of these two formulas is that, if the amenity’s consumption component is
large (α is small), the regional wage gap could be positive in the presence of housing (α−λ/3 >
0) but negative in housing’s absence (α − 1/3 < 0).20 Empirically, housing can be “removed”
from the model by holding housing prices constant in a regression that compares wages in
high- and low-amenity regions. The previous conclusion then says that, when the amenity has
a large consumption component, the private-sector wage comparison could show a negative
gap between high and low-amenity regions controlling for housing-price gaps while showing
a positive gap when prices are not controlled for. Such a contrast would indicate that the
amenity has an important consumption component along with its production eﬀect.
132.4. Comparison to the Roback model
The present model diﬀers from the standard Roback model in several ways. In addition
to the presence of rent-seeking public-sector workers, ﬁrms in the model do not use land, in
contrast to the standard assumption of a land input, and the usual proﬁt-equalization condition
for ﬁrms is absent. Despite these diﬀerences, the predicted amenity eﬀects on private-sector
wages and house prices are identical to those in the Roback framework. In particular, the
amenity lowers the private-sector wage in the consumption-amenity case and raises it in the
production amenity case, with the eﬀect ambiguous in the case of a composite amenity. In
addition, regardless of the nature of the amenity, house prices are higher in the high-amenity
region than in the low-amenity region.
The new implications of the model concern the public-sector wage. This wage is higher in
the high-amenity region regardless of the nature of the amenity. In addition, under reasonable
conditions on the relative size of the public and private sectors, and regardless of the nature
of the amenity, the public-sector wage gap between high- and low-amenity regions is larger
than the private-sector wage gap (which can be negative). These predictions are tested in the
remainder of the paper.21
3. Data
The predictions of the model developed in the previous section are tested using data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources. The basic labor market data come
from the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) ﬁles of the CPS, for the years 1994-2005. The
beginning year is the ﬁrst year after the redesign of the CPS, and we extend the data set only
through 2005 because some of the other data items are measured in 2000 or earlier. We begin
with the standard ingredients of wage equations, for a sample with the following restrictions:
workers aged 18-64 earning wages or salaries (the self-employed and those working without pay
are excluded). The full set of variables extracted from the CPS and used in the regressions is
provided in the notes to the tables that follow. The dependent variable is the log of the hourly
wage either reported by hourly workers or constructed for non-hourly workers. The straight
wage is used, with some exclusions of obvious outliers.
14A key characteristic of workers is their classiﬁcation as either private or public. Within the
public sector, we distinguish between state, local and federal workers, and most of our analyses
focus on how amenities shift wage diﬀerentials for public-sector state and local workers. We
also explore the determinants of public-sector wage diﬀerentials for unionized public-sector
workers, based on union membership as reported in the CPS.
Some of our analyses also focus more narrowly on public-sector workers who are kinder-
garten, elementary, or secondary school teachers, or alternatively corrections oﬃcers, occupa-
tions that are highly concentrated in the public sector and constitute large shares of public-
sector employment.22 These classiﬁcations were made as consistent as possible across years,
given a change in occupational coding between 2002 and 2003.23 Moreover, the estimated wage
regressions include year dummy variables, so that any eﬀects of changes in the composition of
the occupations that aﬀect wage levels are accounted for in the analysis.
We analyze the relationships between public-sector wages and four amenity variables mea-
suring mild weather, dry weather, proximity to navigable water, and population density. The
analysis is done at the state level. The model developed in the previous section could also
operate at a more local level, and some of our amenity variables can of course vary within the
larger states. But there are two problems with a local analysis. First, the physical amenities
we study do not really diﬀer across small areas. Second, even if they did, or even if we used
diﬀerent kinds of amenities with sharp local boundaries—such as school district quality—we
might expect public-sector workers to sort across areas based on quality. For example, a high-
quality school district would likely attract better teachers who end up earning more, leading
to spurious evidence that the school-quality amenity leads to high public-sector pay. Sorting
of public-sector workers across states seems far less likely to be a concern, given relatively low
mobility across states.24
The four amenity variables we use were chosen and deﬁned prior to doing any of the
analysis, based on our reading of key amenity variables at the state level from the existing
urban and regional economics literature. We did not analyze any evidence for other amenities,
and report the full evidence for each of these four amenities. Thus, there was no selection of
results based on which amenities ﬁt the models predictions.
15Mild is the negative of the sum of the absolute values of the diﬀerences between monthly
average temperature and 20 degrees Celsius, summed over January, April, July, and October.
Dry is the negative of the average monthly precipitation for those four months, in centimeters.
The Mild and Dry variables are from Mendelsohn et al. (1994), and both are county-weighted
state averages, using 2006 Census population estimates as weights. Proximity is the negative
of the average distance from the state’s county centroids, weighted by county population,
to the nearest coast, Great Lake, or major river (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003). For each of
these variables, a higher (less negative) value is “better,” indicating less deviation from mild
temperatures, less rain, and a shorter distance to navigable water. Density is the tract-weighted
population density (per square mile) in the state, based on 1990 Census data (Glaeser and
Kahn, 2004). Note that this variable diﬀers from a simple density measure for a state because
it is tract-weighted, with the goal of measuring density where people in a state live. As a
result, the density measure is much higher than average tract density. Finally, we also make
use of estimated state housing price premia. These price measures are computed from 2000
Census data (5 percent sample), as the state dummy variables in a hedonic regression for
house prices. The computational method is the same as in Albouy (2009), although applied
at the state level. Costs are based on both owned and rented homes and include utility costs,
and the regression controls for rental and condominium status, dwelling size, rooms, acreage,
commercial use, kitchen and plumbing facilities, and age of building.25
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample observations, which include 1.75 million
private and public-sector workers. Almost 14 percent of the observations are for public state
or local workers, with almost 3 percent being federal. Unionized workers represent nearly 16
percent of the sample, and unionized state and local workers about 7 percent of the sample.
Descriptive statistics for the amenity variables are shown in Table 2. Note that North
Dakota’s temperatures are the least mild, while Florida’s are the mildest. Louisiana is the
least dry state while Nevada is the driest. Tiny coastal Delaware has the best water access,
while New Mexico is the state most remote from bodies of water. New York is the densest
state, while Arkansas is the least dense.
164. Empirical Findings
The regression model takes the following form:








s + ￿is, (22)
where wis is the wage for worker i in state s, Xis is a vector of characteristics for that worker
intended to control for productivity diﬀerences, PSis is a dummy variable indicating whether
the individual works in the public sector, and Ak
s is the level of amenity k in state s, with
k = 1,2,3,4.26 The hypotheses to be tested are: θk > 0, indicating that amenities raise
public-sector wages relative to private-sector wages; and δk +θk > 0, indicating that amenities
raise the absolute level of public-sector wages. Note that the sign of δk (indicating the eﬀect
of an amenity on private-sector wages) could be positive or negative depending on the nature
of the amenity. The observations in (22) actually come from multiple years, but this fact is
suppressed for simplicity in writing the equation since the main variables of interest (amenities)
are time invariant. A complete equation would thus include time indices and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Because we estimate the model using individual-level data, but the amenities vary only by
state, we cluster the standard errors at the state level. Thus, although the microdata yields a
huge sample, the eﬀective number of observations is of course much smaller.
Note that rent extraction by public-sector workers means, literally, that they earn more
than they otherwise would doing the same work in the private sector. We cannot directly
observe whether this diﬀerence exists. However, labor economists typically use log wage re-
gressions to detect wage diﬀerences net of productivity diﬀerences; examples include using
wage regressions to estimate the eﬀects of unions or discrimination on wages. The challenge is
perhaps more diﬃcult in estimating public-sector wage diﬀerentials, because work conditions
may diﬀer across sectors. Moreover, structural approaches to estimating productivity and pay
diﬀerences (e.g., Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999) are likely to be inapplicable to the ques-
tion at hand because of the diﬃculty of deﬁning output for the public sector. Thus, our test
involves estimating the relationship between amenities and the relative pay of public-sector
workers, rather than a more explicit attempt to ask whether high amenities are associated
with above-marginal-product wages.
174.1. Benchmark regressions lacking a public-private distinction
As a benchmark, the ﬁrst empirical speciﬁcation (shown in Table 3) suppresses the distinc-
tion between the eﬀects of amenities on wages of private- and public-sector workers, regressing
the log of the wage on the amenity variables along with the large set of non-amenity controls
(worker characteristics, and year ﬁxed eﬀects), whose coeﬃcients are not reported. The ﬁrst
four columns show regressions containing just a single amenity measure, while the regression
in column 5 contains all four measures. When included singly, Dry and Proximity have signif-
icantly positive coeﬃcients, while the coeﬃcients of Mild and Density are insigniﬁcant. When
all four variables appear together, Mild’s coeﬃcient remains insigniﬁcant while the remaining
amenity coeﬃcients are all signiﬁcantly positive.
With the public-worker share in the sample being small, the results in Table 3 are presum-
ably driven mainly by the private-worker observations. Since the analysis in section 2 shows
that a positive private-sector wage eﬀect requires an amenity to have a production component,
the positive coeﬃcients for Dry, Proximity and Density evidently indicate that each of these
amenities increases worker productivity in the private sector. Given the substantial evidence
on agglomeration economies (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004), the positive wage eﬀect of
density comes as no surprise. Less expected are the implied productivity beneﬁts of a dry
climate and water access.
As explained in section 2.3, if housing prices are held constant, then the wage impact of
the amenity’s production component is attentuated, providing a better chance for the negative
inﬂuence of the consumption component to manifest itself. To investigate this possibility,
column 6 of Table 3 adds the state housing-price premium for 2000 to the regression. The
housing-price coeﬃcient is itself positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that wages are higher in
states with expensive housing. With housing prices included, the coeﬃcients of Dry and
Proximity lose signiﬁcance (the point estimates are negative), while the coeﬃcients of Mild
and Density become signiﬁcantly negative. These negative relationships, as well as the sign
changes for the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, are what we would expect if each amenity has an
important consumption component (with high density being favorable). Therefore, the results
suggest that the four amenity variables contain both production and consumption components,
18with the production eﬀect tending to dominate (yielding the positive coeﬃcients in column 5).
The theoretical analysis showed that, regardless of the nature of the amenity, house prices
should be higher in high- than in low-amenity regions. Table 4 tests this prediction by regress-
ing the state housing-price premium on the amenity variables. As can be seen in column 5, all
the amenity coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly positive, as predicted.
Before turning to the regressions that distinguish between private and public-sector work-
ers, it is useful to sketch the connection between the results presented so far and the standard
empirical implementationof the Roback (1982) model, as seen in Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn
(1988). In the standard implementation, wage and house-price regressions like those in column
(5) of Tables 3 and 4 are estimated, and the results are then merged to generate estimates
of amenity consumption beneﬁts, following guidance from the theory. For positive wage im-
pacts like those in column (5) of Table 3 to emerge, amenity production eﬀects must dominate
consumption eﬀects, just as in the present framework.
The previous literature also contains an analog to the regression in column 6 of Table 3. In
particular, Henderson (1982) shows theoretically that if a house-price measure is included as
a covariate in a Roback-style wage regression, then the resulting amenity coeﬃcients directly
measure the consumption beneﬁts of amenities. He carries out such an estimation, generating
plausible numericalvalues. By constrast, under the present model, a regression that controls for
house prices does not yield a direct measure of consumption beneﬁts. But the regression gives
these beneﬁts a better chance to show their existence by generating negative wage coeﬃcients,
as explained in section 2.3.
4.2. Main results
To test the main prediction of the model, as embodied in Proposition 1, public and private-
sector workers must be distinguished. Accordingly, the regressions in columns 1-6 of Table 5
include a dummy variable identifying public state or local workers, and they also include
interactions of this variable with the amenity measures. Note that the dummy coeﬃcient
reveals the diﬀerence in the levels of public- and private-sector wages, while the interactions
show the diﬀerence in the wage impact of amenities between public- and private-sector workers.
Before considering these results, it should be noted that we face a limitation in estimating
19the eﬀects of amenities on wages. Because these amenities are time-invariant, we cannot
distinguish between actual eﬀects of the amenities on wages and correlations between these
amenities and other unmeasured state-speciﬁc factors that aﬀect wages. However, in our main
analyses described in this section, we are interested in the interactions between these amenities
and public-sector employment. Thus, even if unmeasured state-speciﬁc factors inﬂuence wages,
as long as they do not aﬀect the diﬀerence between wages for otherwise similar private- and
public-sector workers, these factors will not aﬀect our results. Put equivalently, we can identify
how local amenities aﬀect public-sector wage diﬀerentials in the face of unmeasured state-
speciﬁc inﬂuenceson overall wage levels, evenif we cannot identifythe main eﬀects of amenities.
That is, the public-sector/amenityinteractions are still identiﬁedif we include ﬁxed state eﬀects
in the regressions. In some of the speciﬁcations reported below, we control for other state-
speciﬁc factors, including some that may aﬀect the public-sector wage diﬀerentials that we
estimate. In addition, we show that the estimates of the public-sector/amenity interactions
are robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed state eﬀects.
The (uninteracted) amenity level coeﬃcients in Table 5, which show the amenity impact
on private-sector wages, follow the same pattern as in Table 3, being signiﬁcantly positive for
Dry, Proximity and Density in the regression in column 5 containing all the amenities. In
addition, the public-sector wage dummy is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that wages for
state or local public workers are about 5 percent less than private-sector wages, conditional on
all the covariates.
Turning to the interaction coeﬃcients, the Proximity and Density coeﬃcients are signiﬁ-
cantly positive in the single-amenity regressions (columns 1-4), and both these coeﬃcients as
well as the Mild interaction coeﬃcient are signiﬁcantly positive in the regression in column 5
containing all of the amenities. The null hypothesis that all the interaction coeﬃcients are zero
can also be rejected at a high conﬁdence level. These results provide strong conﬁrmation of
the model’s predictions by showing that public-sector wages rise even more than private-sector
wages in the presence of amenities. Note also that, with both the amenity level and interac-
tion coeﬃcients being positive, the results also indicate that public-sector wages are high in
absolute terms in high-amenity regions, matching the model’s prediction. The bottom panel
20of Table 5 shows the sum of the level and interaction coeﬃcients, with three out of four being
signiﬁcantly positive.
As seen in column 6, controlling for housing prices once again reverses the signs of the
amenity impacts on private-sector wages, with all four point estimates negative and the Mild
and Density coeﬃcients signiﬁcant. However, the interaction coeﬃcients remain positive, again
indicatingthat amenitiesraise public wages relative to private-sector wages when housing prices
are held constant. Since the theory predicts that public-sector wages should rise in an absolute
sense with amenities regardless of whether housing is present in the model, the sum of the
amenity level and interaction coeﬃcients should then be positive regardless of whether or not
the regression controls for house prices. The bottom panel shows that this condition is met for
Proximity and Density, for which the summed coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly positive.
Column 7 drops nonunionized public-sector workers from the sample, so that comparisons
are between unionized state or local public workers and private-sector workers (the sample size
falls to 1.6 million). The results are qualitatively similar to those in column (5). The amenity
level coeﬃcients have the same pattern of signs and signiﬁcance, while three of the interaction
coeﬃcients are again positive and signiﬁcant (Mild and Dry swap signiﬁcance). Note that the
public-sector wage discount grows to 7 percent, evidently indicating that unionized workers
are in lower-paying public job categories. Column 8 shows that controlling for housing prices
leads to results very similar to those in column 6. Most important, perhaps, is the ﬁnding
that the estimated public-sector wage premiums associated with amenities are larger for three
out of the four amenities (and triple in size for Dry and Proximity), consistent with unions
being able to extract more rents. If the comparison is instead between nonunionized public-
sector workers and private workers, the wage premiums associated with amenities are smaller
than those reported in columns 5 and 6 (but still always positive, and signiﬁcant for all of
the amenities except Dry in the speciﬁcation with the housing-price premium included; results
available on request).
A potential objection to Density as an amenity is that it can reﬂect other inﬂuences as
well. First, unlike the other amenity variables, Density is potentially endogenous. However,
although high wage levels overall may attract residents, our concern is with the estimated
21wage gap between public- and private-sector workers. Taking the model seriously, if anything
a high relative public-sector wage should imply less population in a state, conditional on the
amenities, implyingthat, if anything, endogeneity should bias the estimatedeﬀect of Density on
the public-sector versus private-sector wage gap downward—making our evidence of a positive
eﬀect of density on this gap even stronger. Second, high density can correspond to high
urbanization, and working conditions in urban areas may be worse—think of teachers in poor
urban districts—necessitating higher wages in the public-sector speciﬁcally. One response to
this concernis to note that our qualitative resultsdo not depend on the evidencefor Density . In
particular, the estimates for other amenities also provide evidence consistent with the model’s
predictions. Also, although not reported in the table, the three interactions excluding the one
for Density were also jointly signiﬁcant—in this case, and in all other cases covered in the
speciﬁcations that follow. The results therefore are not driven by the estimated interaction for
Density . A second response is that when we look at estimates for two particularly important
groups of public-sector workers—teachers and corrections oﬃcers—we add control variables
that should to some extent proxy for these working conditions, and the results are unaﬀected.
We next explore the robustness or sensitivity of these results along a number of dimen-
sions. First, it is possible that public-sector workers diﬀer from other workers in observable
characteristics, and that it is these other characteristics that—for some reason—are associated
with wage diﬀerentials that vary with amenities. To address this question, Table 6 reports
estimates for various subsets of the sample, including urban vs. non-urban residents, more-
and less-educated workers, and workers in diﬀerent race or ethnic groups. The estimates are
reported for the speciﬁcation from column (8) of Table 5, focusing on the unionized public-
sector workers for whom the theoretical prediction as well as the evidence is stronger. As the
table shows, the results are largely unchanged within each of these subgroups, although not
surprisingly, the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimates is sometimes a bit weaker.27
What do these estimates imply for actual public-sector vs. private-sector wage diﬀerentials?
To provide some idea of what the magnitudes mean, consider (from Table 2) the implied
diﬀerence in the public-sector wage diﬀerential for workers in the worst state compared to
the best state for each amenity. For example, for Mild, the implied eﬀect of being located in
22Florida instead of North Dakota is the diﬀerence in the amenity values in Table 2 multiplied by
the corresponding public-sector/amenity interaction coeﬃcient of 0.0012, or a log diﬀerential
of 0.055 (or approximately 5.5 percent). For Dry, Proximity, and Density, the corresponding
magnitudes for the diﬀerence between the worst and best states are 2.5, 10.2, and 2.9 percent.
Eﬀects of these magnitudes are non-neglible and plausible.28
In Table 7, public-sector workers are limited to those employed at the state level, excluding
local public workers. For local public-sector workers, the ability to extract rents may be weaker
in smaller localities (Rose and Sonstelie, 2010), or the statewide amenity measures may not
capture local amenities well. On the other hand, the local public-sector workers in large cities,
who make up a large share of the public-sector workforce in the state, may be among the
public-sector workers most able to extract rents. The results excluding these local workers,
however, are very similar to those in Table 5. The amenity level and interaction coeﬃcients
are typically positive and signiﬁcant in columns 5 and 7, a conclusion that also applies to the
sum of the coeﬃcients. Several amenity-level coeﬃcient signs switch to negative in columns 6
and 8 when housing prices are included, with interaction coeﬃcients remaining positive. As
in Table 5, for three out of the four amenities the associated public-sector wage premiums
are usually larger when we focus exclusively on public-sector workers who are unionized (and
weaker, although not reported in the table, when the focus is on nonunionized public-sector
workers).
As noted earlier, our amenity variables are potentially correlated with other unobserved
characteristics of states. Although these correlations can contaminate estimates of the eﬀects
of amenities on private-sector wages, they will not bias the estimated eﬀects of the public-
sector/amenity interactions, as long unobservables shift private- and public-sector wages simi-
larly, which seems like a reasonable assumption. For example, if public goods are normal, and
high-income people sort into high-amenity areas, then high-amenity areas may have higher
levels or qualities of public goods. While this sorting could generate a link between amenities
and public-sector pay, it need not imply that amenities are associated with higher public-sector
pay relative to private-sector pay. To illustrate, Table 8 reports estimates that include state
ﬁxed eﬀects. These ﬁxed eﬀects subsume the main eﬀects of amenities, which vary only at
23the state level, but the public-sector/amenity interactions are still identiﬁed. Table 8 shows
that the estimated eﬀects of amenities on the gap between public- and private-sector wages
are very robust to the inclusion of the state ﬁxed eﬀects, as the estimates are very similar to
the corresponding estimates in Tables 5 and 7.29
One potential state “eﬀect” that could shift public-sector wages relative to private-sector
wages, and hence still bias the estimated public-sector/amenity interactions, is the political
composition of a state. In particular, if a more-Democratic state pays public-sector workers
higher wages, and this same political composition does not lead to similarly higher private-
sector wages, then our key estimated interactions would be biased if the amenities vary sys-
tematically across more- and less-Democratic states. To check for such bias, we added data
on the Democratic vote share in the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections.30 Speciﬁcally, we
added the vote share and the vote share interacted with the dummy variable for public-sector
status. As Table 9 shows, the key results for the public-sector/amenity interactions are very
similar to the previous ones in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance; indeed in some
cases the results get stronger.31 Only in one case—for the analysis looking at both union and
nonunion workers incorporating the Clinton vote share (column (3), lower panel)—is there a
notable weakening of the evidence. But for this speciﬁcation, when the analysis is restricted
to public-sector union workers, the evidence is much stronger. The conclusion is that our
ﬁndings are robust to controlling for what is likely the most important alternative source of
public-sector versus private-sector wage diﬀerentials across states.
4.3. Results for teachers and corrections oﬃcers
It is useful to test the model’s predictions on even narrower classes of public-sector workers,
speciﬁcally teachers and corrections oﬃcers. Table 10 shows distributional information for
elementary and secondary school teachers. Three quarters of such teachers are public workers,
with the rest being privately employed. Almost 10 percent of teachers self-report that they are
state-employed,32 while about half of all teachers are union members, regardless of sector.
Table 11 shows the previous regression speciﬁcations with public-sector workers limited to
state and local teachers. Only speciﬁcations with all of the amenity variables are reported. In
column 1, three amenity level coeﬃcients are positive, again indicating higher private-sector
24wages in high-amenity states. The teacher dummy coeﬃcient shows that teachers earn 18
percent less than otherwise comparable nonteachers, while the coeﬃcient for public workers
(all of whom are teachers) shows that these individuals earn 10 percent more than other
teachers. As in Table 5, three out of four amenity interaction coeﬃcients are positive (Dry’s
eﬀect is insigniﬁcant), showing that amenities raise public teacher salaries more than those of
private-sector workers. In two cases, the sum of the amenity level and interaction coeﬃcients
is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating higher absolute teacher wages in high-amenity states.
From column 2, the addition of the housing-price premium yields results that match previ-
ous ﬁndings, with all the amenity level coeﬃcients turning negative (two are signiﬁcant), while
the interaction terms retain their previous positive sign and signiﬁcance. Column 3 adds the
student-teacher ratio interacted with the public-teacher dummy variable in order to control
for the quality of the work environment, which may be related to public-sector wage diﬀer-
entials, either because the work environment aﬀects wages or because the higher wages lead
to a higher student-teacher ratio.33 Note that the inclusion of this variable interacted with
public-sector employment addresses the issue raised earlier regarding other sources of state-
level variation in public-sector wage diﬀerentials. In this case, for example, student-teacher
ratios may vary across states, and this variation, in turn, may be related to the wage premium
for public-school teachers for reasons unrelated to local amenities. The interaction coeﬃcient is
insigniﬁcant, indicating no relationship between public-sector wage diﬀerentials (for teachers)
and student-teacher ratios, and its inclusion has no eﬀect on the main results regarding the
public-sector/amenity interactions. Columns 4-6 of Table 11 restrict public-sector teachers to
those that are unionized, and the results are largely unaﬀected.
Turning to the case of corrections oﬃcers, Table 12 givesdistributional information. Among
corrections oﬃcers (who staﬀ prisons and jails), 95 percent are state or local employees, and
more than half are union members. Table 13 shows regressions where state and local employees
are limited to corrections oﬃcers, and the results closely match previous patterns, despite
the much smaller number of public-sector workers for whom the results are identiﬁed. From
column 1, corrections oﬃcers earn 10 percent more than otherwise comparable workers, while
if they are public state or local employees, that premium is reduced to about 3 percent. The
25positive amenity level coeﬃcients again show that amenities raise private-sector wages, while
the positive interaction coeﬃcients(three of which are again signiﬁcant) indicate that the wages
of corrections oﬃcers rise by more than those of private workers in the presence of amenities.
The sum of the two coeﬃcients is also signiﬁcantly positive in three out of four cases.
Adding the housing-price premium generates now-familiar changes in the amenity impacts
on private-sector wages, as shown in column 2. Column 3 includes a work-environment mea-
sure, equal to inmates per oﬃcer, interacted with the corrections-oﬃcer dummy. This measure
controls for a potential source of across-state variation in public-sector wage diﬀerentials for
this particular set of public-sector workers. Its impact (along with that of a level eﬀect) is
insigniﬁcant, and its inclusion does not aﬀect the other results. Columns 4-6 restrict attention
to unionized corrections oﬃcers, and the results are mostly unchanged, although the eﬀects of
amenities on the public-sector wage premium are generally stronger.
Finally, the regressions in Table 14 provide a falsiﬁcation test by using federal rather
than state or local workers to represent public-sector employees. With federal wages mostly
uniform across the country,34or in some cases reﬂecting local private-sector pay, public-sector
wage diﬀerentials in federal employment should not show the same positive relationship to
state amenities as the diﬀerentials for state and local workers. This prediction is conﬁrmed
by the results in column 1, where we never ﬁnd a positive public-sector/amenity interaction
coeﬃcient.35 Restricting attention to unionized federal workers (column 2) has little eﬀect on
the results.36
5. Conclusion
Non-competitive inﬂuences on public-sector pay have been long debated. On the one hand,
the lack of a competitive market, the presence and continuing strength of public-sector labor
unions, and the high level of political involvement of these unions all suggest that public-sector
workers—particularly when unionized—can inﬂuence their pay and employment. On the other
hand, public-sector pay (and employment) decisions are not made in a vacuum, as taxpayers
can migrate away from locations in which public-sector goods and services are provided in an
excessively costly fashion.
26The presence of local amenities, however, can grant public-sector workers a form of mono-
poly power that lets them extract more rents. People can only consume the beaches and
sunshine of southern California, or beneﬁt from the higher productivity of dense urban areas
like Manhattan, by living nearby, and public-sector workers can therefore extract rents up to
the point where those who pay the rents are induced to leave these high-amenity areas.
The data bear out this connection between amenities and rent-seeking behavior. When we
estimate standard log wage regressions, we ﬁnd that public-sector wage diﬀerentials are in fact
larger in the presence of strong amenities, as are the absolute levels of public-sector wages. The
results are the same whether we look at state and local workers overall or just state workers,
and when we look at important subsets of these workers who receive a lot of attention in
the debate over public-sector pay—teachers and prison guards. Furthermore, the relationship
between public-sector wage diﬀerentials and amenities is stronger for unionized public-sector
workers, consistent with their greater ability to extract rents through both organization and
inﬂuence over the political process. The data also pass a falsiﬁcation test, given that we ﬁnd
no evidence of a connection between wage diﬀerentials for federal workers and these same
amenities.
Despite our compelling evidence, the paper by no means oﬀers a “complete” theory of
public-sector wage determination. Surely, institutional factors such as the cross-state variation
in labor laws studied by Freeman and Valetta (1988) matter, as does the productivity of
public-sector workers and the level of alternative wages they can earn in the private sector.
Developing a fuller understanding of these various inﬂuences on public-sector wages can clarify
the policy debate on public-sector pay, and may prove useful in considering possible reforms
to reduce rent extraction by public-sector workers.
Finally, our empirical analysis is limited to state-level variation in local amenities and
public-sector wage diﬀerentials. Although it may be hard to deﬁne the scope of local markets,
and sorting of workers would be more problematic, richer data on local amenities and these
wage diﬀerentials might permit additional tests of our hypothesis. In addition, in principle our
analysis can be applied to diﬀerences in fringe beneﬁts between the private and public sector,
and studying the connection between beneﬁts and amenities may be particularly informative
27in light of recent concerns over public-sector pensions.
Finally, the same considerations regarding rent extraction and amenities may apply to
other workers who are not necessarily concentrated in the public sector but for whom pay is
strongly inﬂuenced by government regulations, political power (in part through unionization),
and other non-competitive forces. More generally, a similar story may apply to any group that
attempts to use political inﬂuence to achieve goals that impose costs on other taxpayers. High
levels of amenities may impede the mobility of taxpayers that would otherwise put the brakes
on eﬀorts to raid the public till in pursuit of rents or other objectives.
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Adding public-worker z consumption
The preceding results are unaﬀected when public-sector workers consume the public good
along with private-sector workers. Suppose that, instead of caring only about x, public workers
value the public good and pay the same tax as private workers. This tax equals zi+Ri, so that
public workers are paying to cover their own rent extraction (Ri now denotes rent extraction
per worker, public and private). Their income equals w + (Li + M)Ri/M, where w is some
ﬁxed base wage, and where the second term is rent per public worker (of which there are M
in each jurisdiction). This term equals the rent component of the tax (Ri) times the total
number of workers paying the tax (Li + M), divided by the number of public workers.
A public worker’sbudget constraint is then xi = w+(Li+M)Ri/M−zi−Ri = w+LiRi/M−
zi. Note that the portion of the tax covering rent extraction cancels the corresponding part of
income, so that rent extraction continues to yield LiRi/M per public worker. Assuming that
public-sector workers share private-worker preferences, the public-sector workers in region 1
seek to maximize
w + L1R1/M − z1 + v(z1) (a1)
subject to the migration constraint in (3). The choice variables are z1, R1, and L1, with z2
and R2 viewed as ﬁxed.
Letting µ denote the multiplier associated with the constraint, the ﬁrst-order condition for
choice of z1 is (1 + µ)[v0(z1) − 1] = 0. Therefore, the condition v0(z1) = 1 again emerges, so
that z1 = z∗. But with z1 ﬁxed at this value, the remainder of the optimization problem is
to maximize L1R1/M subject to (3). But since this problem has already been solved via the
previous analysis, the previous conclusions are unaﬀected.
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Figure 1: Plot of Public Sector vs. Private Sector Wage Differentials by State 
 
Notes: Plotted points are state averages of residuals from separate log wage regressions 
estimated for state or local public-sector workers and private-sector workers.  Estimates 
are weighted, and include controls for education (16 categories), age and its square, 
union membership, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status (7 categories), residence 
in a metro area, and year dummy variables.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Distribution of Workers 
by Sector and Union Membership 
Public state or local  0.136 
Public state only  0.042 
Public federal  0.026 
Union member  0.156 
Union member and public state or 
local   
0.065 
Union member and public state 
only 
0.015 
Union member and public federal  0.010 
Notes: The sample size is 1,746,644, covering the 48 
continental states.  Estimates are weighted. 
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Amenities by State 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Min. (state)  5 worst states  Max. (state)  5 best states 
Mild  -40.1  11.4  -62.7 (ND)  ND,MN,SD,ME,VT  -17.1 (FL)  FL,LA,CA,TX,MS 
Dry  -7.5  2.9  -12.1 (LA)  LA,MS,WA,AL,GA  -1.7 (NV)  NV,AZ,NM,WY,ID
Proximity (1,000s)  -0.190  0.241  -0.96 (NM)  NM,UT,WY,CO,MT -0.010 (DE)  DE,RI,NJ,NY,FL 
Density (10,000s)  0.322  0.403  0.075 (AR)  AR,MS,WV,SD,VT  2.74 (NY)  NY,CA,NJ,IL,MA 
Notes and sources: The data cover the 48 continental states.  Definitions of variables (and sources) are as follows.  “Mild” is the 
negative of the sum of the absolute values of the difference between monthly average temperature and 20 degrees Celsius, summed 
over January, April, July, and October.  “Dry” is the negative of the average monthly precipitation for those four months, in 
centimeters.  Both are county-weighted state averages, using 2006 Census population estimates to weight.  “Proximity” is the negative 
of the average distance from the state’s county centroids, weighted by county population, to the nearest coast, Great Lake, or major 
river.  “Density” is the tract-weighted population density (per square mile) in the state, based on 1990 Census data (Glaeser and Kahn, 
2004).  Note that this is different from a simple density measure for a state, because it is tract-weighted.  The idea is to measure density 
where people in a state live.  As a result, this density measure is much higher than average density measures.  For the 5 worst (best) 




Table 3: Standard Wage Regressions Incorporating Amenity Variables 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Mild 0.0002 
(0.0012) 





Dry   0.010 
(0.003)
*** 





























        0.023 
(0.003)
*** 
Notes: The sample size is 1,746,644.  Estimates are weighted.  See notes to Table 4 
for definition of state housing price premia.  The regressions include controls for 
education (16 categories), age and its square, union membership, public state or local 
employment, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status (7 categories), residence in 
a metro area, and year dummy variables.  Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level, and are reported in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* indicates that the estimate is 
statistically significant at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent level, based on a t-distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of states (clusters) minus one. 
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005. 34 
 
Table 4: Regressions of State Housing Price Premium ($1,000s) on Amenity 
Variables 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mild 0.028 
(0.025) 
    0.038 
(0.018)
** 
Dry   0.297 
(0.109)
*** 

















Notes: The sample size is 48.  Estimates are weighted by the same weights used in the 
wage regressions (the CPS earnings weights), which provides approximate weighting by 
population size while weighting observations in different states the same as in the wage 
regressions.  State housing price premia are computed from 2000 Census data (5 percent 
sample), as the state dummy variables in a hedonic regression for house prices.  The 
computational method is the same as in Albouy (2009), although applied at the state level.  
Costs are based on both owned and rented homes and include utility costs, and the 
regression controls for rental and condominium status, dwelling size, rooms, acreage, 
commercial use, kitchen and plumbing facilities, and age of building. 
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Table 5: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State or Local Workers 
  
Union and nonunion public-sector workers vs. all workers 
Only union public-sector 
workers vs. all workers 































































































Public state or 
local × mild 
0.0005 
(0.0009) 










Public state or 
local × dry 
 0.0025 
(0.0042) 









Public state or 
local × 
proximity 















Public state or 
local × 
density 

















































































N  1,746,644  1,746,644  1,746,644 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,597,046 1,597,046 
Notes and source: See notes to Tables 3 and 4.  The amenity variables are demeaned (based on the same population weights 
used for the regression, and using the same sample), so that the main effects capture the effect at the sample means.  The 
regressions include controls for education (16 categories), age and its square, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status (7 
categories), residence in a metro area, federal employment, year dummy variables, a dummy variable for union membership, 
and  interactions between the union membership dummy variable and the amenities included in the specification.  In 
columns 7 and 8 nonunionized public-sector workers are excluded.  The “amenity + interaction” rows report the sum of the 
main amenity effect and its interaction with the public-sector worker variable.  Given that the regressions also include 
union-amenity interactions, these sums should be interpreted as the differences within the union or nonunion sector (and 
only the union sector in columns 7 and 8), and do not reflect differences in unionization between the private and public 
sectors. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 36 
 


















































































































































Public state or 
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N 1,265,334  331,712  1,184,290  412,756  1,294,598  146,909  159,851 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  Specification and sample, aside from restrictions noted in column heading, are the same as 
in column (7) of Table 5. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 37 
 
Table 7: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State (Only) Workers 
  
Union and nonunion public-sector workers vs. all workers 
Only union public-sector 
workers vs. all workers 































































































Public state or 
local × mild 
-0.00001 
(0.0007) 








Public state or 
local × dry 
 0.0010 
(0.0031) 











Public state or 
local × 
proximity 















Public state or 
local × density 

















































































N  1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,529,594  1,529,594 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that public local workers are omitted. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample.38 
 
Table 8: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, with Fixed State Effects 
  Public state or local  Public state only 
 Union  and  nonunion 
public-sector workers 
vs. all workers 
Only union public-
sector workers vs. 
all workers 
Union and nonunion 
public-sector workers 
vs. all workers 
Only union public-
sector workers vs. 
all workers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 














Public state or 










Public state or 


























Public state or 
















<0.001 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  Specifications correspond to columns (5) and (7) of Tables 5 and 7.  The only 
difference is that state fixed effects are added, which result in the main effects of the amenity and housing cost 
variables being dropped from the regression equations.     
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample.
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Table 9: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, Adding State Democratic Vote Share and 
its Interaction with Public-Sector Status 
  Public state or local  Public state only 
 Union  and  nonunion 
public-sector workers 
vs. all workers 
Only union public-
sector workers vs. 
all workers 
Union and nonunion 
public-sector workers 
vs. all workers 
Only union public-
sector workers vs. 
all workers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Using state vote share for Michael Dukakis, 1988 
























Public state or 









Public state or 









Public state or 












Public state or 













Public state or 















<0.001 <0.001 0.023 0.001 
Using state vote share for Bill Clinton, 1992 




























Public state or 









Public state or 










Public state or 










Public state or 













Public state or 














<0.001 <0.001 0.200 0.019 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  Specifications correspond to columns (5) and (7) of Tables 5 and 7.  The only 
difference is that the state Democratic vote share (0-100) and its interaction with public-sector status are added.  The 
vote share variables are demeaned (based on the same population weights used for the regression, and using the same 
sample), so that the main effects capture the effect at the sample means.  The main effects of the amenities and the 
sums of the main plus interactive effects are not reported; they were very similar to the corresponding estimates in 
Tables 5 and 7.  The estimates with the housing cost variable added were also very similar to those in Tables 5 and 7.       
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample.  Democratic vote share from uselectionatlas.org 
(viewed May 2, 2012).  
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics on Distribution of 
Teachers by Sector and Union Membership 
Public state or local  0.758 
Public state only  0.096 
Public federal  0.007 
Union member  0.552 
Union member and public state or 
local   
0.507 
Union member and public state 
only 
0.054 
Union member and public federal  0.003 
Notes: The sample is restricted to elementary and secondary 
school teachers, defined based on the following Census of 
Population occupational codes: for 2002 and earlier (1990 
Census codes), teachers in kindergarten or pre-kindergarten 
(155), elementary school (156), secondary school (157), or 
special education (158); and for 2003 and after (2002 Census 
codes), preschool and kindergarten teachers (2300), 
elementary and middle school teachers (2310), secondary 
school teachers (2320), and special education teachers (2330).  
The sample size is 68,127.  See notes to Table 1.   




Table 11: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State or Local 
Teachers 
  Union and nonunion public-sector 
teachers vs. others 
Only union public-sector teachers 
vs. others 

























































































































Student-teacher ratio      -0.005 
(0.002)
** 
   -0.005 
(0.002)
** 
Student-teacher ratio × 
public teacher  
   0.0011 
(0.0054) 
   0.0054 
(0.0089) 









































































<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 






























































N  1,555,101 1,555,101 1,555,101 1,535,822 1,535,822 1,535,822 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that only teachers are included 
among public-sector workers.  The student-teacher ratio is demeaned (based on the same population 
weights used for the regression, and using the same sample), so that the main effects capture the effect at 
the sample means.   
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample; student-teacher ratios are for 2007-8, and 
are taken from http://www.nea.org/home/29402.htm (viewed October 13, 2010). 
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics on Distribution of 
Corrections Officers by Sector and Union Membership 
Public state or local  0.949 
Public state only  0.481 
Public federal  0.051 
Union member  0.562 
Union member and public state or 
local   
0.541 
Union member and public state 
only 
0.292 
Union member and public federal  0.022 
Notes: The sample is restricted to corrections officers, defined 
based on the following Census of Population occupational 
codes: for 2002 and earlier (1990 Census codes), sheriffs, 
bailiffs, and other law enforcement officers (423, which does 
not include police), and correctional institution officers (424); 
for 2003 and after (2002 Census codes), first-line 
supervisors/managers of correctional officers (3700), and 
bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers (3800).   The sample 
size is 6,631.  See notes to Table 1.   
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005.    43        
 
Table 13: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State or 
Local Corrections Officers 
  Union and nonunion public-sector 
corrections officers vs. others 
Only union public-sector corrections 
officers vs. others 













































































































Inmates per officer      -0.003 
(0.004) 
   -0.003 
(0.004) 
Inmates per officer 
× public corrections  
   -0.011 
(0.010) 
   -0.007 
(0.013) 















































































<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 






































































N 1,510,381  1,510,381  1,510,381  1,507,178  1,507,178  1,507,178 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that only corrections officers 
are included among public-sector workers.  The inmate-officer ratio is demeaned (based on the same 
population weights used for the regression, and using the same sample), so that the main effects 
capture the effect at the sample means.   
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample; inmate-staff ratios are taken from 
Stephan (2008, Appendix Table 14).   44        
 
Table 14: Falsification Test, Wage Regressions with Public Sector-
Amenity Interactions, for Public Federal Workers 
  Union and nonunion federal 
public-sector workers vs. all 
private workers 
Only union federal public-
sector workers vs. all 
private workers 





































































N 1,504,288  1,469,974 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that 
only federal workers are included among public-sector workers.  The housing 
cost premia are excluded.  
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 
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47Footnotes
∗We thank Rainald Borck, Kitt Carpenter, Robert Inman, Albert Sol´ e Oll´ e and seminar
participants at several universities for helpful comments.
1See, for example, http://reason.org/studies/show/public-sector-private-sector-salary, and
and http://www.prisoncensorship.info/archive/etext/agitation/prisons/campaigns/ca
/caprisoncrat.html (all viewed December 15, 2010).
2See, for example, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10164/1064943-373.stm and
http://blog.nj.com/njv editorial page/2010/02/post 7.html (both viewed December 15,
2010).





(all viewed December 15, 2010)
4Similar ﬁgures are reported for 2009 in Schmitt (2010).
5Gramlich (1976) argues that the large sizes of public-sector work forces, when ampliﬁed by
sympathetic friends and relatives, guarantees substantial political inﬂuence. He notes that
“there are now about 450,000 full and part-time city government employees in New York
City. If each was married, lived in the city, and had one close friend or relative who would
vote alike on city issues, conceivably 1,350,000 votes, 30 percent of the entire voting age
population and roughly half of the probable number of voters, could be marshalled in favor
of making some strategic concession to, or dealing leniently with, unions.”
6The data are explained in more detail in the notes to the ﬁgure, and later in the paper.
7The resulting emigration might be expected to depress land values in regions with high rent-
seeking. Gyourko and Tracy (1989b,c) test for such an eﬀect and ﬁnd empirical support for
it. Their approach is discussed further in section 2.3 below.
8For additional studies, see Albouy (2009), Beeson (1991), Beeson and Eberts (1989), Gabriel
and Rosenthal (2004), Gyourko and Tracy (1989a), Gyourko, Kahn and Tracy (1999) and
Henderson (1982).
489Since public-sector workers exploit the mobility of private-sector workers in the process of
rent-seeking, making them mobile as well is theoretically impractical. Presumably, however,
job stability in the public sector leads to much lower interregional mobility for these workers
than for private-sector workers, making our assumption not unrealistic.
10Since the number of public-sector workers is ﬁxed in the model, the empirical analysis focuses
only on public-sector wages and not on employment levels. Putting the model aside, there
is no standard empirical approach that one could adapt for identifying diﬀerences in public-
sector employment across states associated with rent-seeking.
11If the amenity were instead gi and its contribution to quasi-linear utility equal to t(gi), a
redeﬁnition that sets ai = t(gi) would yield (1).
12The marginal product could instead depend on a nonlinear function of the amenity, but
suitable redeﬁnition would yield the linear additive relationship (see footnote 10). On an-
other issue, note that the production amenity could reduce costs rather than increase worker
productivity. For example, suppose that heating and cooling cost per worker is given by a
function t(hi), where hi is a measure of climate unpleasantness. Then, with this cost sub-
tracted oﬀ from the marginal product in measuring the worker’scontribution, the wage would
equal f0(Li)−t(hi). This expression can be written as f0(Li)+bi by suitable redeﬁnition of
the climate amenity, matching the productivity formulation.
13This formulation assumes that the consumption and production amenities are positively
correlated, with an increase in A generating both consumption and production beneﬁts.
The less natural case where a region’s features yield consumption beneﬁts but reduce worker
productivity can be handled by a reformulation of the model. To capture this case, α would
be negative, so that bi = αA is negative while ai = (1 − α)A remains positive.
14It can be shown that the second-order conditions for the maximization problem are satisﬁed.
15Note that, after rearrangement, condition (7) requires the elasticity of L1 with respect to R1
to equal −1.
16Since the right-hand side of (18) is less than 2/3, the weaker condition L > M = (1/2)(2M)
(indicating that L exceeds half of the total public-sector work force) actually suﬃces. The
stronger form of the suﬃciency condition is needed, however, when housing consumption is
added to the model, as seen below.
17The private-sector wage increase in region 1 is now proportional to −f00∂L1/∂A + α =
−f00/6g0 + α = α − λ/6. As a result, the regional wage diﬀerence is proportional to (α −
49λ/6)−λ/6 = α−λ/3. Since this expression is less than unity, the rent-per-worker diﬀerence
will exceed it when 2L/3M > 1, as before.
18If public workers were also to consume land, then a change in rent extraction would aﬀect
their utility via the impact of L1 on the h(L1) term, which would be added to (20). This
additional consideration would require a new version of the above analysis, possibly changing
some of the results. In addition, to bring the model fully in line with the Roback tradition,
ﬁrms would also be users of land. In this case, the market-clearing conditions would include
this land usage, and a zero-proﬁt condition would be added for each region. These extra
conditions would be needed to determine the quantities of land used in production.
19To understand their approach, note that, when housing is incorporated in the model, (20)
involves subtraction of a housing price term (equal to s0(1/Li)) on each side of the equation.
Holding amenities ﬁxed, an exogenous increase in R1 then leads to a decrease in price as
L1 falls in response to greater rent-seeking (recall s00 < 0). Gyourko and Tracy (1989b,c)
test for the resulting inverse relationship between housing prices and rent-seeking, using a
measure of union inﬂuence as a proxy for R1.
20Since the presence of housing chokes oﬀ migration sooner when A rises, the decline in f0(L1)
is not as large, keeping the private-sector wage (f0 + αA) from declining even when α is
relatively small. In the absence of housing, however, a larger decline in f0 occurs, which
more easily dominates the productivity gain from the amenity, leading to a wage decrease.
Therefore, when housing is absent, a decline in the wage can occur in the presence of a
larger productivity eﬀect from the amenity (equivalently, a smaller amenity consumption
component—a smaller α) than with housing in the model. In other words, when housing is
absent, the consumption component of the amenity does not need to be as large to generate
a wage decline as when housing is present.
21Another testable prediction of the model is that taxes rise with a region’s amenity level in
order to support higher rent extraction. However, a credible test of this predictionwould need
to hold public-good levels constant since the model’s prediction of a uniform z level across
regions is not realistic. This diﬃculty, combined with the fact that the test would only rely
on a simple cross section at the state level, limits the appeal of such an exercise. In contrast,
for our analysis of wages, we study the diﬀerence between public-sector and private-sector
wage diﬀerentials associated with amenities, and–as discussed below–the private-sector wage
diﬀerentials capture state-level diﬀerences that may be correlated with amenities.
22Elementary and secondary school teachers are by far the largest occupation in local govern-
ment, and elementary and secondary school teachers and “bailiﬀs, correctional oﬃcers, and
jailers” (all of which we group under “corrections oﬃcers”) are the second and third largest
occupations in state employment (after post-secondary teachers); see Schmitt (2010). We
also focus on corrections oﬃcers and elementary and secondary school teachers because their
50pay is often prominent in public debate.
23Elementary and secondary school teachers are deﬁned based on the following Census of
Population occupational codes: for 2002 and earlier (1990 Census codes), teachers in kinder-
garten or pre-kindergarten (155), elementary school (156), secondary school (157), or special
education (158); and for 2003 and after (2002 Census codes), preschool and kindergarten
teachers (2300), elementary and middle school teachers (2310), secondary school teachers
(2320), and special education teachers (2330). Correction oﬃcers are deﬁned using the same
Census codes as follows: for 2002 and earlier (1990 Census codes), sheriﬀs, bailiﬀs, and other
law enforcement oﬃcers (423), and correctional institution oﬃcers (424); for 2003 and af-
ter (2002 Census codes), ﬁrst-line supervisors/managers of correctional oﬃcers (3700), and
bailiﬀs, correctional oﬃcers, and jailers (3800). Inspection of the share of the workforce in
these two occupation groups as deﬁned indicated that the deﬁnitions were consistent across
the change in the data between 2002 and 2003.
24See http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/ (viewed April 22, 2012).
25We thank Jed Kolko for supplying us with these estimates.
26We do not control for occupation because many occupations exist largely in only the private
or only the public sector, and even when they do exist in both sectors, they may be quite
diﬀerent. Thus, occupation controls are not necessarily human capital controls, and could
potentially capture diﬀerence between private- and public-sector workers instead. Below,
however, we do look at results for two speciﬁc occupations that constitute large shares of
the public sector: teachers and corrections oﬃcers.
27Note that the table reports results for speciﬁcations including the housing-price premium, in
which case the main eﬀects of the amenities are more reﬂective of consumption amenities.
In some cases (most notably, perhaps, for workers with a Bachelor’s degree), the estimated
main eﬀects of the amenities do not replicate the negative estimates found for the full sample.
However, in speciﬁcations excluding the housing-price premium, the estimated coeﬃcients of
the main eﬀects for most of the amenities were consistently positive, as in Table 5, suggesting
that the value of these amenities on the consumption side may vary across diﬀerent types
of workers. Regardless, the estimated public-sector/amenity interactions were very similar
when the housing-price premium was excluded.
28These are the diﬀerences in the public-sector vs. private-sector wage diﬀerential. The overall
wage diﬀerence for public-sector workers between two states would be this diﬀerence plus
the main eﬀect of the amenity, which would be computed by applying the amenity diﬀerence
to the estimates in the last four rows of Table 5. Thus, for example, for Proximity, the
implied diﬀerential would be 7.7 percent–less than the 10.2 percent ﬁgure because the main
eﬀect of this amenity (in the regression controlling for housing prices) is negative.
5129Note that the estimates correspond to those in columns 5 and 7 from those tables. The
housing price premium also varies only at the state level, and hence there is no diﬀerence
between the speciﬁcation with and without this premium included, once the state ﬁxed
eﬀects are added.
30We wanted to use data from prior to the sample to reduce the likelihood of reverse causality.
Taking our model seriously, in states where public-sector workers can extract rents because
of high amenities, public-sector unions likely work harder to support the political party
(presumably Democrats) that enables them to extract rents. Recall that the 1992 election
also included Ross Perot, who received substantial vote shares in many states.
31Note that the Dukakis vote share is not associated with higher relative public-sector wages,
while the Clinton vote share is.
32Our understanding is that most teachers (except some in prisons and some special needs
teachers) are local-government employees. However, given the heavy involvement of state
government with education, many teachers may report themselves as state employees.
33In the latter case, we are not addressing the potential endogeneity of student-teacher ratios,
and the results must just be interpreted as asking whether the partial correlations between
public-sector wage diﬀerentials and amenities remain the same when the student-teacher
ratio is partialed out.
34See http:/www.opm.gov/oca/09tables/locdef.asp (viewed December 30, 2010).
35The negative point estimates could indicate that federal pay diﬀerentials do not fully reﬂect
private diﬀerentials.
36In Table 14, the house price premia are excluded. Their inclusion has no eﬀect on the results.
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